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The advent of IT has created unprecedented opportunities for the occurrence of computer crime like fraud, committed by 
employees in particular. This paper focuses upon computer fraud committed by employees because reports claim that it is 
the employees who pose one of the greatest threats to organisations today. Further it argues that solely relying only on 
current legalisation and other sophisticated measures alone are inadequate for the managing the occurrence of computer 
fraud committed by employees. Therefore the onus of detecting and managing computer fraud committed by employee(s) 
lies within the organisations itself. In conducting the argument it discusses the shortcoming of the current legalisation and 
the challenges it can pose to deal with such acts. Consequently the main contribution of this paper is to enhance the 
awareness about management of computer fraud committed by employees. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
There is a widespread agreement that the proliferation and integration of Information Technology (IT) into 
organisations inevitably has increased the occurrence of computer related criminal acts like fraud (for example 
see Ernest and Young 2004; CSI/FBI 2005; Audit Commission 2001 and 2005). Despite the increased 
sophistication of preventative measures taken by organisations, summary of the recent Audit Commission Report 
(2005), for example illustrates that such illicit acts will continue to increase in future. What is even more 
alarming is that both researchers and practitioners advocate that the reported cases of computer crime only 
represents the tip of the iceberg (for example, Parker 1976; Parker and Nycum,1984; James and Palmer 1994; 
Icove et al.,1995; Fox, 1998;CSI/FBI 2005; Audit Commission 2005). Although such threats can come from 
both within and outside the organisations, most reports (Ernest and Young 2004; CSI/FBI 2004; Audit 
Commission 2005) claim that it is the employees who pose one of the greatest threats to the organisations today. 
The 2005 report by the Audit Commission, for example, illustrated the majority of intentional computer crime 
was perpetrated by the organisation’s own employees, more specifically operational staff accounting for 37 per 
cent; administrative/clerical staff 31 per cent and managers around 15 per cent. This could be because employees 
are more familiar, not only with the organisation’s computers, but they also have access to them and they know 
the ‘flaws’ in the information systems and the resources that the computers control. Hence employees within 
organisations are in a better position than outsiders to engage in computer fraudulent activities (see for example, 
The Barings Bank case in the Bank of England Report 1995; Harrington, 2000; Audit Commission, 2001 and 
2005; CSI/FBI, 2005).This is not to say that computer crime incidences committed by outsiders is less serious in 
nature. It is clear that dealing and managing illicit computer related crime committed by employees is more 
sensitive since it involves the reputation of the organisation. Yet it is alarming to note that there still continues to 
be a pervasive misconception that responding to computer fraud originating from outside the organisation is the 
same as responding to fraud originating from within (Schultz, 2002). This myth has been widely accepted 
perhaps because few studies have been conducted to understand the problem of computer fraud committed by 
employees in particular. Despite well documented surveys and reports on the extent of damage caused by 
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employees (often referred to as insiders), remarks from researchers that there is currently “no substantial effort 
devoted to addressing the problem” (Magklaras and Furnell 2003, pg 26) is a clear indication of the lack of such 
studies. This is not to say that researchers have not focused their attention on such studies (see Dhillon 2001; 
Schultz 2002; Magklaras and Furnell 2005). However, limited studies on computer fraud committed by insiders 
and misconceptions concerning such acts (Schultz, 2002). In addition, the growing problem of computer crime is 
further compounded by the fact that such cases are not restricted to one particular country.  
Against this backdrop, the focus of the paper is on computer fraud, one type of computer crime 
committed by employees. This is based on the argument that such employees plan their acts and take ‘calculated 
risks’ to intentionally abuse computers resulting in the violation of safeguards by trusted employees. 
Consequently this paper argues that onus of detecting and managing computer fraud committed by employee(s) 
lies within the organisations itself. Therefore solely relying only on current legalisation and other sophisticated 
measures alone are inadequate for the managing the occurrence of computer fraud committed by employees in 
particular. For the purpose of this paper, computer crime can result from incompetence, ignorance, negligence in 
the use of IT or deliberate misappropriation by individuals. Intentional illicit activities such as fraud, virus 
infections, illicit software, theft of data and software, unauthorised private work, invasion of privacy and 
sabotage are all examples of computer crime. Computer fraud (one type of computer crime), on the other hand is 
defined as a deliberate misappropriation by which an employee tries to gain unauthorised access to the 
organisation’s computer systems. The misappropriation itself may be opportunistic, pressured, or a single-
minded, calculated plan.  
This paper is divided into five sections. After a brief introduction, section 2 reviews some of the main 
reports and surveys to illustrate the seriousness and complexity of the ever-increasing problem of computer 
crime. It also discusses various challenges posed in managing computer fraud. This is followed by section 3 that 
focuses on legal issues in the context of management of computer fraud. In doing so, it identifies the emergent 
issues of concerns and shortcomings in the existing legalisation. Finally a discussion is presented in section 4, 
followed by a conclusion in section 5. 
 
2 SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM OF COMPUTER FRAUD WITHIN 
ORGANISATIONS 
Most reports and surveys advocate that figures representing computer crimes are only the tip of the iceberg. This 
could be attributed to perhaps the reluctance of organisations fearing the unnecessary media publicity, in 
particular, of those crimes committed by their employees (Smith 1988; Icove et al; Fox 1998; Audit Commission 
1998, 2001 and 2005). Consequently, any attempts to estimate the actual costs of such offences are speculative. 
Having said that, the volume of reported cases indicate that the potential impact of computer crime within 
organisations are indeed large. For example, computer crime costs US organisations more than $400 billion 
annually. Similarly “2002 Computer Crime and Security Survey” conducted by CSI/FBI reflected that 90% of 
respondents (primarily large corporations and government agencies) detected computer security breaches within 
the last twelve months. Although, CSI/FBI survey categories encompass incidents that could potentially have 
come from either sources (for example theft of proprietary information, sabotage of data networks, and virus), 
three of them very clearly illustrate the origin. It is evident from the figures highlighted in such reports that 
although relate to a period over where the proportion of outsiders had exceeded insiders, the quantifiable losses 
in the latter case dwarf those attributable to outsiders. Similarly the three reports (1998, 2001 and 2005) on 
computer crime by the Audit Commission illustrated a 38% increase of fraud within organisations. This is far out 
weighed by the staggering near five-fold increase in the number of reported cases of viruses. Other types of 
computer crime show significant increase also, albeit frequently from a small base. Another report by the High 
Technology Crime Investigation Computer Forensics and Digital Evidence Report indicated that over 25% of all 
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Fortune 500 organisations have been victimised by computer crime with an average loss ranging from $ 42 
million to $10 billion.  
Against this backdrop, it can be argued that computer crime unlike other traditional crimes tends to defy 
quantification. Attempts to estimate the actual costs of such offences and what proportion of computer crime is 
exactly committed by employees are speculative. Nonetheless the extent of damage gauged from the findings of 
various recent reports and surveys mentioned above indicates that the potential impact of computer crime is 
large. Consequently the seriousness of the problem cannot be underestimated.  
  
2.1 Complex Nature of Computer Fraud 
While trying to understand the occurrence of computer fraud, there has been a tendency in official reports to 
individualise computer fraud, attributing the blame to the ‘rotten apple in the barrel’ (for example, see Doig 
1984; Kesar and Rogerson 1998). As a consequence, many researchers believe that employees who engage in 
computer fraud are normally motivated by greed, selfishness and individualism that are inherent in the values of 
capitalist society which, could turn an otherwise trusted employee into an embezzler or saboteur (see Davies 
1990; Croall 1992; Icove et al 1995; Parker 1998). Such issues can be also be associated with complex human 
emotions and needs such as financial pressure that Croall (1992), for example, considers the initial motivation 
for computer crime. However, Cressey (1986) adopts a different viewpoint, which is a more individualistic 
approach to explain the causes of computer crime. He relates activities such as embezzlement to personal, non-
sharable and financial problems. There have also been attempts to examine what, if any, characteristics 
distinguish these individuals. For example, Parker (1984; also see Parker 1998), outlines some characteristics of 
such offenders (he also focuses on some characteristics of hackers). Similarly Goodwin’s (2000) article indicated 
that disgruntled employees can also be a major threat, particularly if they understand IT. The Barings Bank case, 
for example, reflects computer fraud committed by a low status ‘rogue trader’ employee. Nicholas Leeson, a 
former employee of Barings Bank engaged in computer fraud that allowed him to conduct illicit trading for 
almost three years with being caught (for details, see the Bank of England Report 1995; case study described in 
Rawnsley 1995 and  Kesar and Rogerson, 1998). 
Against this backdrop, it is difficult to determine the different status levels of employees involved in 
such acts but there is often a tendency in official reports to individualise such activities by attributing it to 
personality traits or personal problems of individual offenders (Croall 2001). Public media, in the UK for 
example, tend to focus on cases where the major themes are “fall from grace” of “wealthy and extravagant 
lifestyle” of the offenders (Levi 1999, pg 48). For example, subsequent investigation into Leeson’s illicit trading 
activities pointed out that the change of flux involving a combination of ambitious internal reconstructing, 
integration of the bank and brokering operations created weaknesses within the Bank. In other words, a primary 
reason for the collapse of Barings Bank was the absence of appropriate safeguards (such as diffusion of 
responsibility) that created a situation where Leeson took advantage of the loopholes in management practices to 
engage in illicit trading. This is not surprising as most reports and surveys also claim that computer fraud is not 
particularly sophisticated or complex but mostly relies on the lack of basic security procedures (Audit 
Commission 2001; Ernst & Young 2004; CSI/FBI 2004; CSI/FBI 2004; Audit Commission 2005). Leeson, for 
instance, was able to circumvent management, who were responsible for internal and external auditors, internal 
controls and regulatory bodies in both Singapore and the Bank of England (for details, see restructuring of 
Barings Bank &Co and Barings Securities Limited in the Bank of England Report 1995; also see detailed 
description of the case in Kesar and Rogerson, 1998.  
The example above also provides more complex messages. Whether such acts took place because the 
offender was motivated by personal gain or by the profitability of the organisation is an important question. In 
both cases, researchers believe that the characteristics of the offender also play a significant role (Croall, 2001). 
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Sweeping though these generalisations, it seems that considering the personal traits of the offender may 
be important; but there is little evidence to support any association between computer crime and individual 
pathologies (ibid). While considering the personality traits of an offender does provide a starting point for 
investigating the occurrence of such illicit activities, the problem arises when studies tend to be more focused on 
the “rotten apple in the barrel” (Doig 1984) and aim to chalk out either the characteristics of the offender, or 
attempt to answer the question “how does such out-of-character” computer crime occur. In their study, Parker 
and Nycum (1994) outlined some characteristics of such offenders who engage in hacking. Similarly, Cressey 
(1964) studied the cases of hundreds of embezzlers using symbolic-interaction theory to understand the 
characteristics of potential offenders. Other studies link computer crime with business success (Box, 1983). 
However, evidence to suggest that all offenders who engage in computer related crime like fraud within 
organisations are ‘bad people’, is an assumption that can be challenged (Punch 1996, pg 84). This is because the 
relationships between individual, organisational and sociological factors also play an important part in the 
occurrence of computer fraud (see Schrager and Short 1997, pg 410).  
In trying to understand computer fraud within organisations, the above approach tends to serve as an 
ideological function where the focus diverts attention from the “barrel” (Doig 1984), which include practices and 
other issues associated with the organisation itself. This strengthens the contention that individual explanations, 
although often associated with computer crime, is however, limited in explaining the underlying causes of such 
acts.  In this context, Croall (2001) further advocates “Individual motivations must be located in the wider 
context of the organisations in which the offending takes place and the cultural values that encourage or 
discourage offending” [Pg 84].  
In the light of this, traditional criminology studies that focus on criminal motivations of individuals now 
have been generally dismissed as superficial and over-generalised by most researchers (for example, see 
Braithwaite 1984; Nelken 1997). Slapper and Tombs (1999), for example argue that the so called “general 
theories” do not explain the criminal values or how crimes originate and may therefore explain the perpetuation 
of crime but not its origin. Researchers like Clarke (1997) believe that two main ‘mistakes’ are made by 
traditional criminology. Firstly, criminologists assumed that understanding the crime is the same as 
understanding the criminal (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Secondly, the misconception relates to the aspect of 
crime control versus dealing with the criminal (Wilkins, 1990) which asserts that the solution of reducing crime 
implies a focus on the criminal. Within Information Systems (IS) studies, these types of control to combat 
computer related criminal acts, such as fraud, general deterrence theory from criminology has been used to 
predict the use of deterrent security countermeasures such as IS security polices and guidelines, security 
awareness programmes and preventative security software. These deterrent measures are applied with the idea 
that they will ‘lower’ abuse of information systems by convincing potential offenders (employees) that there is 
too high a certainty of getting caught and that punishment can be severe (Straub and Welke, 1998). Information 
systems researchers have relied on deterrence theory, which although useful, has been recently criticised for its 
limitations (see D’Arcy and Hovav 2004). Nonetheless researchers are consistent to claim “Deterrent efforts 
correspond to certainty of sanctions because the amount of such efforts directly affects the probability that IS 
abuser will be caught” (Kankanhalli et al. 2003, pg 141). This again is dependant upon the working environment 
of the organisation. Therefore, an employees’ perceptions of threats imposed by ‘deterrence security 
mechanisms’ may not be directly proportional to the actual level of controls and safeguards implemented within 
an organisation (D’Arcy and Hovav 2004). Consequently, researchers argue that it is the perception of sanctions 
themselves that can lead to deterrence (Gibbs, 1975; Tittle, 1980; Straub, 1990; Kankanhalli et al. 2003). 
Researchers have also pointed out the need for such studies to take into account the impact of individual 
characteristics such as gender and age (D’Arcy and Hovav 2004). Overall, the general theory of deterrence does 
provide a sound theoretical justification for the use of deterrent countermeasures as a means to limit acts of 
computer related crimes committed by employees it nevertheless, is a partial viewpoint to understand the 
complex nature of such illicit acts.   
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Differing in its focus from most criminology studies is a relatively new school of thought, Situational 
Crime Prevention (SCP), where the emphasis is more on the criminal settings, rather than the criminal (Clarke, 
1997). Thus, rather than detecting or sanctioning offenders, the starting point of SCP is to circumvent the 
occurrence of generic crimes and to reduce criminal tendencies through enhancement of society, like better 
housing or education. Little attention was given to this new school of thought by criminologists and policy-
makers until Clarke’s seminal work in 1997. Similarly, Croall (2001) suggests that most of the earlier theories 
that focus on individual choices to commit crime tend to exclude white-collar offenders, and are therefore 
considered inappropriate. This is important to note since computer crime, as argued by various researchers is a 
form of white-collar crime (for different viewpoints, see Perrolle 1987; Johnson 1994; Maner 1996; Hollinger 
1997).  
From the above discussion so far, it becomes clear that computer crime is complex in nature and 
encompasses different types of acts. Moreover it can be argued that the complexity associated with computer 
crime within organisations can be fully understood when personality traits are seen in the context of the wider 
organisational issues, which is a pre-requisite for participation in such offences (also see Mars 1982; Dhillon and 
Backhouse 1996; Dhillon 1997; Kesar and Rogerson 1998; Audit Commission 1998; Dhillon 1999). This is 
because reports and survey indicate that a failure in basic controls is still a problem within organisations. As 
noted earlier, this manifests itself as the failure of some organisations to implement even the most basic controls, 
thereby leaving information systems vulnerable. Consequently, some studies link computer crime, fraud 
committed by employees particularly with wider organisational and structural problems such as diffusion of 
responsibility within organisations (Audit Commission 2005). Hence, it can be argued that lack of basic 
safeguards can create an environment in which, employees do not directly feel responsible for the consequences 
of their actions. In such a situation an employee can perhaps justifiably blame the consequences on another 
employee (Harrington 1995). Therefore such employees are less likely to suffer from guilt from committing an 
action that may have been law breaking (for examples, see Gotterbarn 1991; Croall 1992; Nissenbaum 1994; 
Johnson and Mulvey 1995; Laudon 1995; Kesar and Rogerson 1998). Such a climate created by top management 
within an organisation can indeed be conducive to computer crime. 
It is perhaps evident that such a climate, as described above, can provide potential offenders with 
suitable opportunities for ready misappropriation of information systems within an organisation (for examples, 
see Angerfelt 1992; Audit Commission 1994; Gapper and Denton 1996; Pearson 1996; Audit Commission 1998; 
Walsh 2000; Power 2001). The 2001 and subsequently the 2005 Audit Commission Report, for example, 
characterised organisational problems such as a lack of safeguards, together with ineffective monitoring and lack 
of internal audits as the basis of opportunities for occurrences of computer crime. Some of the principle 
weaknesses cited by offenders were poor administrative practices such as inefficient password policies, out of 
date technical knowledge, and lack of security software within organisations (for examples, see Oz 1994; 
Forester 1994; Audit Commission 1998; Goodwin 2000; Power 2001). As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to 
estimate exactly what proportion of fraud is committed by high or low status employees, never the less there are 
indications that potential offenders can also take advantage of given suitable opportunities where organisations 
have failed to take the necessary precautions (see, for example, Vitell and Davies 1990; Peterson 1994; 
Rawnsley 1995). Moreover, depending on the occupations, some organisational structures would provide more 
opportunities than others (for example, see Mars 1982, who categorises occupations on the basis of various 
opportunities within an organisation). This perhaps explains why the figures reflecting the occurrence of 
computer crime committed by employees are increasing in number.  
 
Discussion so far sheds light on the complex nature of computer fraud committed by employees, in particular. 
Indeed some of the issues classified above cannot be easily explained by irrational impulses or personality 
problems (Croall 1992). Consequently there are many challenges posed in managing such illicit acts, particularly 
those committed by employees. These are discussed below. 
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2.2 Challenges Posed for Management of Computer Fraud       
The advent of IT also poses many challenges to organisations in trying to manage computer crime like fraud 
committed by employees. Traditionally, security has often been associated with locks, barriers and uniformed 
guards (Parker 1981). However, it was soon realised that tangible technical measures had to be taken to 
overcome threats like computer crime. Research, so far, has provided conflicting evidence about how far top 
management is implicated in offences and about how well informed they tend to be. There is probably a 
considerable variation within top managements, but they do play an important role in influencing the internal 
structure of the workplace, and that has a direct relationship with the occurrence of computer fraud committed by 
employees (see Turner 1994). Mintzberg (1983), for example maintains a similar viewpoint that is supported by 
the notion of a system of ideology. Clinard and Yeager (1980) on the other hand, note that the size and 
delegation of duties within large organisations, for example, can produce an environment favourable to the 
commission of computer crime. Consequently this indicates that top management can use their authority within 
the organisations to circumvent control at the operational level (Croall 1992; Clarke 1990; Braithwaite 1984; 
Braithwaite 1985; Audit Commission 1998, 2001 and 2005). Hence influence, whether internal or external, on 
this norm structure can result in the individuals within organisations being divided, thus creating a subculture 
within an organisation. Such a subculture is often interpreted as a more-or-less organised response on the part of 
employees to organisational structures, managerial policies or payment systems (Mintzberg 1983; Croall 1992). 
Indeed this indicates that subcultures can arise in response to particular aspects of the technological and social 
organisation of work. As mentioned earlier, organisations that rely heavily on IT will become vulnerable to 
intentional illicit activities committed by employees.  
3 LEGALISATION AND COMPUTER FRAUD 
Indeed IT offers some new and highly sophisticated methods for law breaking, which in turn, create the potential 
to commit traditional types of crimes in non-traditional ways. Cases of computer crime that result in computer 
fraud, theft and sabotage are constant reminders of a growing problem for the international society today. In light 
of this, this section reflects on some of the major divergent approaches used to manage computer fraud 
committed by employees, in particular.  
Different jurisdictions have tried to tackle computer crime using a variety of instruments depending on 
the different ways in which, they have been affected by such acts (Jones 1992). Such is the concern for computer 
crime that the attention of international organisations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (1986), the International Chamber of Commerce (1988) and the Council of Europe (1990), 
amongst many others, have focused on the question. A discussion about various guidelines available for policy 
makers and legislators in the context of the focus of this paper follows.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of thirty industrial market-
economy nations examines issues involving economic, social and governance challenges of a globalised 
economy. The Council of Europe has produced guidelines for policy makers and legislators in dealing with 
computer crime. In 1983, OECD undertook a study of the possibility of an international application of legislation 
to address the problem of computer crime. As a result in 1986, it published Computer-Related Crime: Analysis 
of Legal Policy, a report that surveyed the existing laws and proposals for reform in a number of member states. 
In addition, it recommended a minimum list of misuses that countries should consider prohibiting and penalising 
by criminal law, such as fraud and forgery, alteration of computer programs and data and copyright violations. 
The Computer and Communication Policy Committee also suggested that criminal protection should be 
developed against other types of abuse, including theft of trade secrets and unauthorised access to, or use of, 
computer systems.  
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Following the completion of the OECD report, the Council of Europe (1990) initiated its own study to 
develop guidelines to assist legislators. Hence the recommendations of the Council of Europe on computer crime 
contained guidelines for nation legislation that in effect was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on September 13, 1989. Further, in 1992, the OECD developed a set of guidelines for the 
security of information systems. The main aim of these guidelines was to provide a foundation on which the 
State and the private sector can construct a framework for the security of IS. Although a study was conducted by 
the Council of Europe that concentrated on procedural and international co-operation issues related to computer 
related crime, much of the international work has so far been centred in Western European and OECD countries. 
On March 1997, the OECD issued further guidelines to address other information security concerns like 
Cryptography (Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks: Towards a Culture of 
Security). This was adopted by the OECD Council on July 25, 2002.  
Further expanding work undertaken by the OECD, and the European Committee on Crime Problems of 
the Council of Europe developed a set of guidelines for national legislators that enumerated activities that should 
be considered as a subject of criminal sanction. Rather than attempting to define the term ‘computer crime’, they 
left individual countries to adapt to the functional classification of their respective legal systems and historical 
traditions. In addition, The Council of Europe’s European Committee on Crime Problems 1990 proposed a three-
step approach towards addressing international computer crime that included measures to improve international 
collaboration. More recently, the Council of Europe has been addressing the problem of the increasing number 
of computer crimes linked with the Internet. Most countries have directed their attention towards legislation as a 
treatment to combat computer crime, in consequence some form of legislation exists in each country to address 
such activities (see, BloomBecker 1986; Shackelford 1992; Hollinger 1997; Reed and Angel 2000). In 
formulating legislative responses to computer crime, three alternative approaches have been identified in the 
literature (for details see, Jones 1992; Shackelford 1992; Walden 2000): The evolutionary approach; Amending 
existing statutes; and Enacting computer-related statutes.  
The first approach, the evolutionary approach, deals with the application of the general criminal laws by 
expanding concepts and definitions to include certain types of computer crime. The second approach, amending 
existing statues, is when countries actually amend their existing laws to include additional offences such as 
computer fraud (for example, West Germany, amended its 1987 Penal Code to include an additional fraud 
offence of ‘computer fraud’ and the Swedish Data Act 1973 was amended in 1982). The solution of enacting 
computer-related statutes is a third approach, which large jurisdictions either adopted or proposed (some of the 
legislation such as the Computer Misuse Act and The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act will be discussed in later 
sections). In Europe, countries such as Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and Greece, for example, had made 
extensive amendments to their existing criminal law by 1990. Since then, however, countries such as Spain, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom have introduced laws dealing with computer crime. Other countries such as 
Japan, Canada and the United States of America (both at a state and federal level) have introduced new statutes 
(Note that because countries such as Canada, United States and Australia, are federal states, the position is 
further complicated ). In light of this, many countries, in aiming to prevent unauthorised access to and tampering 
with information systems, have adopted or amended their existing legislation. In response to increasing 
incidences of computer related crime, Hong Kong, for example developed their first legislation that specifically 
addresses such issues (see Kennedy 2001). Further the changing nature of computer crime (computer fraud in 
particular), Australia introduced the Criminal Code Amendment (Theft, Fraud, Bribery and Related Offences) 
Bill on 24 November 1999, which proposes the implementation of the Model Criminal Code offences on this 
topic. The policy was updated in July 1999, and since then consultations have been taking place with relevant 
Commonwealth agencies in Australia. The United States and Great Britain are just two of the many countries 
that have enacted national legislation in response to the growing problem of computer crime (also see 
introduction on key developments regarding European Computer Law, see edited book by Reed and Angel 
2000). As mentioned earlier, two main pieces of legislation that were developed directly to deal with computer 
related issues are: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 and The Computer Misuse Act of 1990. Given 
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the focus of this paper, brief discussion of these Acts will provide useful insight into the approaches adopted to 
manage computer fraud within organisations. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFFA) became the 
first piece of legislation specifically targeted at deterring and punishing computer crime at the federal level in the 
United States, while the Computer Misuse Act became a law in the United Kingdom to deal with cases primarily 
linked with computer crime. A brief discussion of the contents follows.  
 
3.1 The Computer Misuse Act 
The seeming inability of current legislation to cope with hackers was one of the main reasons to set up a Royal 
Commission to look at the whole area of computer crime. As a consequence, to halt computer crime, the United 
Kingdom promulgated the Computer Misuse Act of 1990. It is believed the primarily motivations for the 
government support were similar to the reasons given when the Data Protection Act (DPA) was first introduced 
into Parliament in 1983 (Walden 2000). In an attempt to encompass a wide range of computer related crime, the 
Act’s eighteen sections employs broad language to define these substantive offences (Shackelford 1992). When 
the British Law Commission analysed computer related crime statutes in other jurisdictions, it found that each 
had approached the issue from different perspectives, resulting in substantially different offences, where most of 
these statutes attempt to criminalise the same basic activities. The Commission also found that countries 
generally adopted one of three alternative approaches, mentioned above, to computer crime. Based on the 
Commission’s recommendations, Parliament adopted a half-way approach whereby “new offences are created 
only when necessary to encompass computers” (Shackelford, 1992). Further Shackleford acknowledges the 
several advantages that this half-way offers. At the same time, he points out that the computer-specific 
enactment, if drafted properly, and in turn adopted by many countries, would serve as a “basic mechanism for 
addressing the international aspects of computer crime”. Again the three offences of the British Misuse Act (also 
see Elbra 1990) are: Intentional and knowing unauthorised access to any computer, or the programs or data 
contained therein, or any attempts to gain unauthorised access, including exceeding authorised access; 
Unauthorised access as defined above, with the intent to commit or facilitate a further offence and intentional 
and knowing unauthorised modification of the contents of any computer.  
 
3.2 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
The Computer Fraud Act of 1986 was signed as a law to clarify definitions of various computer related crimes. It 
was a culmination of several years of discussion and research among legislators. The Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act of 1984 (CFFA) was amended with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (the ‘1986 Amendment’). 
This Act extended the scope of the previous Act and clarified some of the ambiguities in the original piece of 
legislation. Consequently, the Act enhanced and strengthened an intermediate Fraud and Abuse Act established 
in 1984. Subsequently, it also complemented the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, which 
outlawed the unauthorised interception of digital communications. Further, the CFAA provides additional 
penalties for fraud and related activities with regard to access devices and computers. This legalisation is related 
to federal privacy protection to computerise information maintained by financial institutions and clarifies 
unauthorised access of computers used by the United States government. The three new offences this particular 
legalisation describes are: unauthorised computer access with the intention to defraud, malicious damage via 
unauthorised access and trafficking in computer passwords with the intent to defraud.  
A wide ranging definitions of ‘computer’ has been given in the US Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, 1984: The term ‘computer’ means an electronic, magnetic, optical electrochemical, other high speed data 
processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions and includes any data storage facility or 
communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device. Many jurisdictions have 
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provided similar definition to the term additional to that of ‘computer’ (for example, see California statues for 
the definition of ‘computer network’ or the Canadian Criminal Code for the definition of ‘computer program’). 
Various pieces of legislation have been used to prosecute offenders who commit crime. Perhaps the two 
most prominent cases to ‘test’ the new legislation of The Computer Fraud and Misuse Act are Robert Morris (a 
twenty two old graduate student at Cornell) and the Herbert Zinn (a high school drop out). Both these cases 
involved unauthorised access into computer systems (for details, see for example, Johnson 1994). Purging the 
‘worm’ (Morris created a ‘worm’ that crashed computer systems) from computer systems cost organisations 
several days of production and millions of dollars.  
 
3.3. Legal Challenges in the Context of Management of Computer Fraud  
Most researchers and information security practitioners agree that with the advent of IT, one of the main threats 
relates to corporate data. It is often assumed that organisations are future oriented, concerned about their 
reputation and ‘quintessentially rational’ (for example, see Braithwaite and Geis 1982). The lack of boundaries 
and physical constraints, combined with both the speed in which transactions takes place and the magnitude of 
intentional harm, have indeed changed many of the traditional paradigms of criminal law. As mentioned above, 
the two Acts discussed above were specifically developed to deal with computer crime. This is not to deny that 
other existing Acts can be used in dealing with the issues associated with computer crime. Consequently what 
has been observed is that in the past few years, due to IT, change resulted in revisions of the existing laws and 
development of new ones necessary to combat the increasing problem of computer fraud. 
International organisations, such as OECD, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations have a key 
role to play to help organisations combat computer related crime, nonetheless they are dependent upon the 
actions of national governments in passing appropriate laws and seeking international agreements. Also the 
private sector has a part to play in persuading national governments to take the necessary steps in combating 
computer crime. Consequently just to rely on such bodies can indeed be time consuming. The debates associated 
with ‘Cyber Crime’, for example, continues to shows signs of no consensus reached due to the very complex 
nature of computers (for examples, see the CERT report). In addition, the existing English laws, like the Theft 
Act 1968, Walden (2000), for example, states that either the legislation was drafted in an era before the 
emergence of such technology was envisaged, or because statutory drafting has failed to be robust enough to 
appropriately address information technology. He compares fraud, criminal damage, obscenity and forgery cases 
that involve computers with the traditional existing criminal legislation to prove his point. Thus broadly 
speaking, we have seen legislative attention to computer crime grow dramatically in the early 1980s, as 
computers became increasingly central to organisations to the conduct their business. In their paper, “The 
process of criminalisation: the case of computer crime laws”, Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce (1997) analyse the 
process by which recent laws related to computer crime have been formed. They state: “Individual reformers, 
rather than widespread grass roots social movements of economic interest groups, have been the principal force 
behind the passage of computer crime legislation…those who were most influential in the formation of computer 
crime laws have been computer abuse ‘experts’ and legislators”. Furthermore Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce 
believe that computer crime laws possess a significant symbolic component. Andeneas (1987), on the other hand 
believed that computer crime laws are symbolic in that they ‘educate’, ‘moralise’, or ‘socialise’ computer users. 
He justifies his statement by giving an example of the development of occupational codes of ethics by data 
management professional organisations after criminalisation was virtually completed (see Johnson and Snapper 
1985; Johnson and Nissenbaum 1995). No doubt the analysis of Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce (1997) does 
provide a useful insight, however, as pointed out by Raymond (1997), it does not identify any methods through 
which media presentations about the harm of uncontrolled computer access resulted in computer crime 
legislation. Consequently, if computer crime legislation is symbolic, then it leaves several important questions 
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unanswered. Subsequently it is important to understand and identify the roots of this symbolism (for details, see 
Raymond 1997). 
The Computer Misuse Act, on the other hand, has been criticised for the notable omission of an actual 
definition of the term ‘computer’ (Hollinger 1997). Although the Law Commission felt is was not necessary to 
include the definition, Hollinger believes that was perhaps an unwise decision since: “All the attempted 
definitions that we have seen are so complex, in an endeavour to be all-embracing, that they are likely to produce 
extensive argument and thus confusion for magistrates, juries and judges involved in trying our proposed 
offences”. According to Walden (2000) it is potentially extending its scope to “everyday domestic appliances 
and cars that incorporate computer technology”. Having said that, the Law Commission found support for a 
general view not to define terms like ‘computer’, since they believed that if defined, they would be “so complex, 
in an endeavour to be all-embracing, that they are likely to produce extensive argument”. This viewpoint also 
has been adopted by other jurisdictions, such as France and Germany, the United States being an exception, 
where they have actually defined ‘computer’ in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Although improvements 
were made in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), as pointed out by Hollinger (1997) it nevertheless 
lacks a clear definition of important terms such as ‘access’, ‘effects’, and ‘use’. In spite of the writer trying to 
simplify the language of CFAA, it seems difficult to comprehend (for example, see Johnson 1994). The 
Computer Misuse Act was essentially designed to make ‘computer hacking’ an offence (Rigby 1994), however it 
mainly deals with computer crime specifically related to government and financial institutions. With regard to 
CFAA, many argue that it has loopholes and ambiguities that make it difficult to prosecute (Kluth 1990). 
Prosecution of Robert Morris for the “Internet worm” (as mentioned above), for example, and the ensuing 
debates illustrate the loopholes and ambiguities in legislation that was developed to deal with computer crime in 
the first place. In addition, legalisation addressing cybercrime is further complicated from such Acts can be 
subject to state and federal level (or different countries). In fact, multiple prosecutions are possible for various 
offences arising out of the same computer related criminal act. Regardless of the nature of computer crime, in 
US the enforcement and prosecution for all crimes are covered by federal and criminal statues. This requires two 
elements. First the government must prove a criminal act (actus reus)-that is the government has to make the act 
a crime before the offender may be charged with a criminal act. Second, the government must prove a criminal 
intent (mens rea). The main challenge with this element is that the so-called criminal intent is not clear. Indeed 
both these elements, particularly in the context of computer fraud committed by employee(s) poses many 
challenges.  
Against this backdrop, the lack of any international agreement for addressing computer related crime 
and the mechanism for dealing with international computer fraud would be in place but inoperable (for details, 
see Shackelford 1992; Rigby 1994). No doubt many countries have addressed the increasing incidences of 
computer crime but like other legislation, it too has been criticised for its ineffective implementation. For 
example, in March 1992, the Hong Kong Government passed for the first time a bill on computer crime 
(Kennedy 2001). Lee’s 1995 paper critically examines the provisions of this law and their implications for 
information systems security, in particular). Consequently investigations involving cases of computer crime 
cases, and in consequence the gathering of appropriate evidence for a criminal prosecution, can prove to be 
extremely difficult and complex not to mention time consuming. This is primarily due to the intangible nature of 
data, especially in networked environments within organisations (see Shackelford 1992). Walden (2000), for 
example, believes that IT renders the process of investigation and recording of such cases vulnerable to claims 
by the defence of “error, technical malfunction, prejudicial interference or fabrication”. This viewpoint can lead 
to a ruling from the court against the admissibility of evidence. Further researchers also have pointed out that 
existing laws cannot be applied easily to deal with computer related crime and so additional substantive 
legislation is required (for example, see Bainbridge 1996). The question is whether any useful lessons can be 
learned from such Acts (for example, the Computer Misuse Act). Although in theory many forms of computer 
crime could be dealt with using existing legislation, in practice prosecuting people who are involved in computer 
misuse is hard and demanding (see the case of Craig Neidorf in Spinello 1997). This problem is further 
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exacerbated as most organisations for various reasons are reluctant to report computer crime cases, particularly 
those involving their own employees. 
In discussion the shortcomings of existing legalisation, Harrington (1996), for example, compares the 
Codes of Ethics and law, since she believes that they are “formal sanctions studied as part of deterrence 
research”. She justifies her analogy by stating that codes have the same underlying mechanisms as laws and 
other legal sanctions, as both aims to reduce incidences of illicit activities such as computer misuse. In the 
context of computer fraud, Harrington found that codes of ethics do have an effect, but they are related only to 
certain abuses. Oz (1992), on the other hand used a framework to compare different codes of ethics. 
Furthermore, Johnson and Snapper (1985) question the use of the codes and their implications for professional 
behaviour and the real meaning of their ethical demands. Thus they believe that such codes leave a number of 
questions unsettled. No doubt codes of ethics have been developed to provide guidelines for computer 
professionals, but these codes have certain inherent limitations since they do not necessarily make a person 
behave ethically (for example, see Johnson 1985; Forester and Morrison 1994; Harrington 1996). It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to discuss the critique on such codes. However the lack of positive findings for the effects 
of codes in the context of management of computer crime acts like fraud occurring from within the organisation 
does strengthen the argument that laws and other measures alone are not enough to combat this serious growing 
problem.  
4 DISCUSSION  
Employees at all levels of the occupational hierarchy can have many opportunities to misuse their occupational 
roles that can result in computer fraud. Indeed different jobs provide a different ‘illegitimate opportunity 
structure’ within organisations for employees to exploit. However, it is important to note that not all employees 
exploit opportunities within organisations. Whether they do or not may well be related to other aspects of the 
social organisation of work (Croall 1992). Nonetheless, employees can profit economically if they have access, 
which can readily be used. These opportunities are in turn related to the way in which a particular occupation is 
organised and to the level of supervision that exists within the organisation. In light of this, when considering 
effective measures to manage computer fraud committed by employees in particular, perhaps the first thing that 
comes to mind to an organisation as a means of protection is the development of ‘security’ techniques and 
legalisation. However organisations cannot rely solely on technical or legal measures to protect their businesses 
from threats that occur due to violations of safeguards by trusted employees. This is because employees who 
intent on gaining unauthorised access through deception usually discover the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of 
new technology long before the agents of society and law enforcement (see Croall 1992; Hollinger 1997). When 
the offender is an employee of the organisation, the difficulties of prosecuting them is further exacerbated, for 
relatively few employees have been brought to the court. Such a paucity of prosecution has been attributed to a 
range of reasons (also see Parker 1976; Bequai 1983; Parker and Nycum 1984; Croall 1992; Walden 2000). 
Firstly, fear of adverse publicity makes organisations hesitant to report the cases of computer crime committed 
by their employees. Secondly, lack of adequate training within prosecuting authorities. Thirdly, the trans-
national nature of computer related crime and the associated jurisdictional problems (for example, complexity of 
collecting, investigating, and prosecuting the offender). Finally networked environments within organisations 
can exacerbate the problems of obtaining evidence and subsequently presenting it before the courts. Indeed 
unfavourable publicity and long investigations, prosecutions and trails can, to some extent, act as deterrents. 
Consequently, it is often assumed that the major aim of sentencing offenders is deterrence (Croall 1992). This 
reflects a general view that offenders are deterrable, since the focus here is on those employees who take 
‘calculated risk’ to take advantage of the weaknesses of IS. Nonetheless, this deterrent potential can be 
undermined by the low rate of actual detection and prosecution of employees who engage in computer fraud 
within organisations (for example, see Bainbridge 1996). Consequently it can be argued that preventive 
measures taken within an organisation have a better preventive effect than penal laws, as we can see from the 
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difficulties and complexity involved in prosecuting offenders. Some researchers believe that a lack of 
prosecutions under the CFAA could also be attributed to issues unrelated to the Act (Bainbridge 1996). As a 
result, these can create significant challenges for organisations. In addition the cost involved in the process of 
prosecuting an offender can be very high. Indeed there is a paradoxical tension between the benefits that 
computers can bring to society and the potential for serious abuse, and this presents a rudimentary dilemma for 
organisations. Given the ambiguities and loopholes existing in computer laws perhaps explains why some of the 
computer related crimes are dealt with as ‘theft’ by organisations (Lloyd 1990). 
Against this backdrop, it is clear that it is not just flaws in computer criminal acts that lead to a lack of 
prosecution, but issues, which simply cannot be dealt with by legislation and other technical measures. Many 
questions are also raised to and whether threats from computer fraud and sabotage are amenable to effective 
treatment just by applying technical approaches (for example, Loch et al 1992; Dhillon 1997; Parker and Nycum 
1984; Dhillon and Backhouse 1995; Dhillon 1999, Dhillon 2000). No doubt risk evaluation or determination of 
security policies and procedures will enhance the effectiveness of security within an organisation. At the same 
time, it is important to be aware that management of computer fraud committed by employees in particular 
warrants a consideration of self-regulation where sophisticated security measures do not contain only technical 
issues but also consider issues related to the underlying causes of such intentional illicit acts. In other words, the 
onus for preventing and managing such acts committed by employee(s) lies within organisations themselves. 
This is because opportunities for computer misuse may well be spread within an organisation, but different 
responses arise from various pressures and working conditions which may originate within organisations or from 
outside. Consequently, such factors have a profound significance for analysing and understanding the complex 
nature of computer fraud. 
Neumann (1991), for example provides a good argument that is particularly worth noting in the context 
of management of computer fraud within organisations. He advocates that management needs to consider 
security as both a functional and behavioural issue. In addition, it has been suggested that steps could be taken 
within organisations to educate employees about the dangers that both the employees and the organisation can 
face from such threats. This is because when employees are aware of the consequences of their behaviour, they 
become “part of the security program” (Spafford et al 1989).  
 
5 CONCLUSION  
The management of computer fraud committed by employees in particular is a multi-faceted problem that is 
being addressed by researchers and practitioners alike. Indeed it looks quite different from different points of 
view: the victims, the perpetrators, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, computer professionals and 
criminologists. Nevertheless, the discussion in this paper reveals that by far one of the greatest threats to an 
organisation comes from within, where employees may gain unauthorised access to information systems and 
intentionally committed computer fraud. No doubt the advent of IT has created unprecedented opportunities for 
the occurrence of computer fraud, particularly those committed by employees themselves. With this in mind, the 
main contribution of this paper has been to enhance the awareness about management of computer fraud 
committed by employees in particular. Critical reflection on various laws about computer related crime 
illustrated two main problems: establishing jurisdiction over alleged offenders and establishing identities of the 
alleged offender.  
To conclude, it can be seen that management of computer fraud is not so straight forward. Neumann’s 
(1991) highlights three gaps that he believes may permit such illicit activities. The first gap he identifies as a 
‘technological ‘gap’, which stresses technical deficiencies in both hardware and software. The second gap, the 
‘socio-technical gap’, refers to the gap that divides computer-related policies and other issues such as computer 
crime laws, codes of ethics and standards of good practice. Finally the third is the ‘social gap’, which relates to 
social policies and actual human behaviour. Neumann goes on to explain the significance of such gaps and 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology                  Vol. 1   Issue 1     2006  
 37 
developments and methods that could be applied to narrow them. Addressing computer related crime 
specifically, Patrice Rapalus, CSI Director (Source: http://www.gocsi.com), remarks in the "Computer Crime 
and Security Survey," indeed strengthens the argument presented in this paper: 
"Over its seven-year life span, the survey has told a compelling story. It has underscored some of the 
verities of the information security profession, for example that technology alone cannot thwart cyber attacks 
and that there is a need for greater cooperation between the private sector and the government. It has also 
challenged some of the profession's 'conventional wisdom,' for example that the 'threat from inside the 
organization is far greater than the threat from outside the organization' and that 'most hack attacks are 
perpetrated by juveniles on joy-rides in cyberspace.' Over the seven-year life span of the survey, a sense of the 
'facts on the ground' has emerged. There is more illegal and unauthorized activity going on in cyberspace than 
corporations admit to their clients, stockholders and business partners or report to law enforcement. Incidents are 
widespread, costly and commonplace. Post-9/11, there seems to be a greater appreciation for how much 
information security means not only to each individual enterprise but also to the economy itself and to society as 
a whole. Hopefully, this greater appreciation will translate into increased staffing levels, more investment in 
training and enhanced organizational clout for those responsible for information security." 
Keeping in mind Neumann’s three gaps and comment by the Director of CSI, this paper has contributed 
to enhance the awareness about the underlying causes of computer fraud and consequently promote a better 
understanding of the complex nature such act committed by employees in particular. Further it has provided an 
in-depth discussion on computer crime laws to reveal that such laws alone are still inadequate to deal with the 
emerging adverse consequences linked with IT (computer fraud within organisations in particular). In other 
words it has addressed what can be done rather than what needs to be done in the context of management of 
computer fraud committed by employees (Baskerville 1993). 
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